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THE RICHT OF THE STATE TO DEMAND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
AUTOMOBILE OWNERS
WHEN Massachusetts, in 1927, enacted its famous compulsory automobile
insurance law, 1 the scope and novelty of the statute centered universal
attention upon it as the first far-reaching attempt to deal with the problem
of automobile accidents from a remedial rather than a preventive point of
view.2 The Massachusetts statute remains unique in its comprehensiveness,
but recognition that the tremendous volume of motor traffic makes absolute
accident prevention an impossibility has led to other legislation of a cura-
tive nature; eleven states following, but less boldly, the lead set by Massa-
chusetts have made a more restricted effort to guarantee the financial re-
sponsibility of automobile owners by requiring, at the penalty of loss of
license, that bond or insurance be provided after the award or non-pay-
ment of a judgment in a negligence suit or after conviction of a motor law
offense. 3 An advisory opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court 4 do-
1 MASS. Cumr. STAT. (1927) c. 90, § 34A-34-I (proof of financial responsi-
bility, in bonds, insurance, or deposited security, up to $5000 for injury or
death to one person, and $10,000 for injuries or death, resulting from one
accident, made a condition precedent to the granting of automobile regis-
tration to any applicant).
2 See Chamberlain, Compulsory Insurance of Automobiles (1926) 12 A. B.
A. J. 49; (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 314; (1926) 20 ILL. L. REV. 813; Snow,
Some Legal Aspects of Compulsory Automobile Insurance (1927) 6 Ono. L.
REv. 193; Heyting, Automobiles and Compulsory Liability Insurance (1930)
16 A. B. A. J. 362.
3 CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, Supp. 1929) Act 5128, § 73 (g) (see infra
note 7); CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 1609 (proof of ability to satisfy future
damage claims required from both operator and owner, after conviction of
certain offenses, or accident involving personal injury or $50 property
damage, in which the car was involved and the operator was partly at
fault) ; IowA STAT. (1929) c. 118 (automatic suspension of driver's license
if accident judgment is unsatisfied after sixty days, until payment or
security is furnished up to $5000 and $10,000 for personal injuries, $1000
for property damage); ME. LAws (1929) c. 209 (security in the usual
categories and amounts, as in the Iowa statute, must be furnished upon
conviction of drunken or reckless driving by the operator, and may also
be required of the owner; and license or registration or both may be sus-
pended until payment of a judgment in a civil accident suit); MINN.
STAT. (Mason, 1927) c. 412, §§ 2720-2761 (under penalty of license revoca-
tion, a $2500 bond conditioned for the payment of future accident judg-
ments must be filed upon conviction of certain motor law offenses) ; N. D.
LAWS (1929), c. 163, § 1 ($2000 bond required upon conditions similar to
those in the Minnesota statute) ; N. H. LAWS (1927) c. 54, reenacted N. H.
LAWS (1929) c. 189 (on finding of negligence in a preliminary inquiry
upon petition in an action for damages, the driver's license and, if the
car had been driven with the owner's consent, the registration certificate,
are suspended until the judgment is paid or security given); N. J. LAWS
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clared for the constitutionality of that state's inclusive law before its pas-
sage, and its validity has never since been questioned.5 But the California
Supreme Court, in the recent case of Exv parte Lindlcyl branded as dis-
criminatory and void a statute typical of the narrower method of regula-
tion.
The California statute under review provided for revocation of the driv-
er's license and the car's registration unless a judgment for personal injury
or for property damage in excess of $100, resulting from an automobile
accident, were paid within fifteen days, and bonds, insurance or other se-
curity furnished to make certain the payment of future judgments of a
like nature.7 The court, apparently viewing the statute as a punitive
rather than a protective measure, seized upon the poor man's possible in-
ability to pay damages as creating a classification founded on wealth
rather than culpability, and declared the statute thus violative of the
equal protection and due process clauses of the state constitution. In a
concurring opinion, directed chiefly against an earlier Massachusetts decla-
ratory judgment s which had upheld a proposed statute similar to that
enacted in California, the seeming disregard of the remedial function of the
statute was further illustrated by the argument that it could not be upheld
as a preventive police measure since the penalty was not imposed for negli-
gence and would not tend to discourage negligence.
Yet the general regulatory principle involved in this type of statute is
not new. The power of the state to require bonds or insurance as a con-
dition precedent to granting a license to engage in certain occupations con-
nected with the public health, safety, and moral welfare has long been
recognied.O It is, moreover, generally admitted that the state may regu-
(1929) c. 116, § 1 (proof of financial responsibility in insurance, bonds,
or security, is required upon conviction of certain offenses, or the operation
of a car "concerned in" an accident involving perzonal injury or $100
property damage); N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Supp. 1929) c. 64 (a), §§ 94 ct scq.
(security must be furnished as in the California statute, and also for
conviction of certain offenses); R. I. Acrs (1927) c. 1040, reenacted 1I. I.
AcTS (1929) c. 1429 (security must be furnished by operators and may
also be required of owners, for conviction of certain offenses, and may be
imposed after a preliminary investigation, for lesser violations resulting
in personal injuries or over $100 property damage); VT. L,%ws (1929)
No. 76, § 1 (very similar to the Connecticut statute); WIs. STAT. (1929)
§ 85.08 (upon recommendation of a court of record, the license is sus-
pended after certain motor law convictions or a judgment due to the
driver's negligence, unless a bond is given for payment of the judgment,
or until the judgment is satisfied).
4 In re Opinion of Justices, 251 Mlass. 569, 147 N. E. 681 (1925).
Cf. McNeil v. Powers, 165 N. E. 385 (Mlass. 1929) (recovery denied
under the Massachusetts Statute because driver not owner's agent, although
he was a brother of the owner operating with the latter's express consent
and knowledge) ; Note (1929) 9 B. U. L. REv. 212 (disapproving the deci-
sion as tending to nullify the effect of the law).
G 291 Pac. 638 (Cal. 1930).
7 Supra note 3. Under the California statute the amount of security
to be furnished is limited to $5000 and $10,000 for persenal injuries, and
$1000 for property damage.
s In re Opinion of Justices, 251 Mass. 617, 147 N. E. 680 (1925).
9 Hawthorn v. Illinois, 109 Ill. 302 (1883) (statute requiring operators
of butter and cheese factories on the cooperative plan to give bond held
constitutional) ; cf. Kansas City ex rel. Barlow v. Robinson, 322 Mo. 1050,
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late the use of its public highways by prescribing conditions deemed neces-
sary for the public safety;10 and upon this ground license and registration
statutes, 1' and legislation of various types designed to prevent negligence, 12
to assist the injured person in obtaining his action at law,13 or in satisfying
his judgment,14 have been sustained. Furthermore, the majority of states
require owners of motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire to take out
17 S. W. (2d) 977 (1929) (city ordinance requiring bond for blasting
operations upheld); Mike Beringer Moving Co. v. O'Brien, 235 Mo. App.
632, 240 S. W. 481 (1922) (city ordinance requiring bond from movers
upheld). But cf. Gibbs. v. Tally, 133 Cal. 373, 65 Pac. 970 (1901); Valen-
tine v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 124 Mich. 664, 83 N. W. 594 (1900); Har-
rigan & Reid Co. v. Burton, 224 Mich. 564, 195 N. W. 60 (1923); Mer-
chants Mutual Auto Liability Insurance Co. v. Smart, 267 V. S. 126, 45
Sup. Ct. 320 (1925). See (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 661.
10 Florida v. Allen, 83 Fla. 214, 91 So. 104 (1922), 26 A. L. R. 735 (1923);
Maine v. Mayo, 162 Me. 62 (1909); cf. Glass v. State Board of Public
Roads, 44 R. I. 54, 115 Atl. 244 (1921); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 'U. S.
307, 45 Sup. Ct. 324 (1925), 38 A. L. R. 286 (1925).
"Rizzo v. Douglas, 121 Misc. 446, 201 N. Y. Supp. 194, (Sup, Ct. 1923);
Lee v. State, 163 Ga. 239, 135 S. E. 912 (1926); Atwood v. Crowo, 110
Conn. 288, 147 Atl. 871 (1929).
12 People v. Stryker, 124 Misc. 1, 206 N. Y. Supp. 146 (Sup. Ct. 1924)
(suspension of driver's license upon arrest for driving while intoxicated) ;
Tanguay v. State Board of Public Roads, 46 R. I. 134, 125 Atl. 293 (1924)
(suspension of driver's license of anyone involved in accident resulting in
death); Packard v. O'Neil, 45 Idaho 427, 262 Pac. 881 (1927), 56 A. L. R.
313 (1928) (conclusive presumption that anyone intoxicated was unable
to operate a car).
13 People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N. Y. 115, 102 N. E. 530 (1913) (penalty
for leaving scene of accident); Downing v. City of New York, 219 App.
Div. 444, 220 N. Y. Supp. 76 (1st Dep't 1927), aff'd, 157 N. E. 873 (city
liable for employee's negligence) ; of. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1929)
c. 253, §§ 62-63; MASS. ACTS (1929) c. 281; IOWA CODE (1927) §§ 5072,
5079; T.x. STAT. (1928) art. 1150; Wis. STAT. (1929) § 343.181 (statutes
imposing fine or revoking license for leaving scene of accident); CONN.
PUB. AcTs (1929) c. 297, § 24; VA. ACTS (1926) c. 474, § 31; WASH.
CoMVp. STAT. (1922) § 6352 (statutes making it a duty to report accidents) ;
N. J. LAWS (1927) c. 232; MASS. CUM. STAT. (1927) c. 90; N. Y. CONS.
LAWS (Supp. 1929) (statutes providing for service upon non-residents);
MICH. PUB. ACTS (1929) No. 19, § 29; CAL. STATS. (1929) c. 261; N. Y.
CONS. LAWS (Supp. 1929) c. 64 (a), § 59; IowA CODE (1927) § 5026
(statutes imputing negligence to the owner of the car where it is driv en
with his express or implied consent); IOWA CODE (1927) § 5026; WIS. STAT.
(1929) § 85.08; CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1929) c. 253 § 23 (statutes
imputing the negligence of minor to the owner, parent, or one who per-
mits him to drive); CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering 1929) c. 260; N. Y. CONS.
LAWS (Supp. 1929) c. 27, § 282 (g); CONN. LAWS (1927) c. 209 (statutes
providing for the liability of states or cities for the negligence of em-
ployees).
14 Ex parte Maryland Motor Car Insurance Co., 117 S. C. 100, 108 S. E.
260 .(1921); Mammina v. Alexander Auto Service Co., 333 111. 158, 104
N. E. 173 (1928), 61 A. L. R. 649 (1929) (statutes creating a lien on the
car for the satisfaction of a personal judgment for.damages resulting
from an automobile accident). Cf. TENN. ANN. CODE: (Supp. 1926) §§
3079a, 197bl; S. C. CODE (1922) 5706, § 4; VA. GEN. LAws (1923) § 2146.
[Vol. 40
1931] NOTES
liability bonds or insurance covering any judgment which may be obtained
as a result of their negligent operation;13 and although the penalty of
denying registration, or license, by which this requirement is enforced, is not
based upon negligence it has been upheld by the United States Supreme
Court as a reasonable exercise of the state police power.10 Statute s of the
type declared unconstitutional by the California court are no more discrimi-
natory than these and countless other examples of regulatory legislation
whereby the exaction of a minimum of responsibility inevitably militates
more harshly against the poorer man and could hence be said to create a
classification founded upon wealth. Moreover the impending penalty of
exclusion from the highways for failure to pay an accident judgment could
be effectively anticipated by voluntarily taking out liability insurance be-
fore a negligent accident forces such action along with payment of the
judgment claim. Recognition of the advantage of such a step might well
result in giving the after-accident statutes an effect more nearly like that
of the Massachusetts law.
That the state police power is not limited to preventive legislation would
seem clear from the sanction accorded to the Workmen's Compensation
Laws. Acceptance of the fact that industrial accidents are, to a degree,
unavoidable has led to concentration upon securing an effective remedy for
the injured man.' 7 The statute under discussion represents a further rec-
ognition of this principle, and a limited attempt to apply it in a new, but
analogous, field. In view of the amount of uncompensated damage result-
ing from automobile accidents,' s and in the face of the general approbation
accorded the more comprehenlve Massachusetts statute,1 9 it would seem
not only unfortunate, but unreasonable and shortsighted to hold such an
attempt unconstitutional.
- MTE. LAws (1925) c. 167, §§ 7-16; N. J. LAWS (1927) c. 80; VA. GEN.
LAws (1923) § 2154 (a) 4; ILL. ANN. STAT. (1927) c. 95 (a), § 44; CONN.
LAws (1929) c. 248; N. Y. GEN. LAWS (Supp. 1929) e. 64 (a), § 1T. Cf.
Willis v. Fort Smith, 121 Ark. 606, 182 S. W. 275 (1916) ; State v. Bates,
30 S. W. (2d) 248 (Tenn. 1930); In re Paul Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, 150
Pac. 348 (1915) (cases upholding municipal ordinances requiring security
from various types of common carriers).
.3Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257 (1924). See
Northern Pacific Ry. v. Schoenfeldt, 123 Wash. 579, 213 Pac. 26 (1923);
Weksler v. Collins, 317 fll. 132, 147 N. E. 797 (1925); New York v.
Martin, 235 N. Y. 550, 139 N. E. 730 (1922).
17 See New York Central RI. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 207, 37 Sup.
Ct. 247, 254. Cf. Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Board of Indiana,
255 U. S. 144, 41 Sup. Ct. 252 (1921).
8 The problem of financial irresponsibility has been accentuated in re-
cent years by the extensive use of the installment plan purchase and of
conditional sales, both of which have created a large class of automobile
"owners" unable to pay money judgments. See Note (1926) 24 Micn. L.
Ilnv. 586.
19 In re Opinion of Justices, supra, note 4. Even under the Massachusetts
statute, it is still necessary for an injured person to seek relief through
the courts. Because of the difficulties of proving negligence, the technical-
ities and unavoidable delays of legal procedure, compulsory accident com-
pensation administered in the manner of the Workmen's Compensation Laws
has been widely advocated. See Report of the Special Commission to
Study Compzdsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance (1930) 15 MBLss. L. Q.
7; (1926) 12 VA. L. REG. (N.S.) 33; Carman, Id a Motor Vehicle Accident
Compensation Act Advisable (1919) 4 MINN. L. REv. 1; Marx, Compzdsory
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DELAYS IN EVICTION ACTIONS AS A MEANS OF UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEI'
FROM 1919 to 1922 the Emergency Housing Law's 1 evoked a furore of
protest and approbation. Now once again as a result of an "emergency"-
this time a widespread business depression-the problem of state regulation
of housing in time of stress has been presented to the courts, The issue
has arisen from an attempt on the part of the mayor's Unemployment Relief
Committee of New York City to alleviate the effects of unemployment by
instructing the city marshalls to refuse to execute warrants of eviction for
non-payment of rent. The recent issuance of a mandamus on application of
a protesting landlord in the case of In re Altmanz has nullified the Com-
mittee's action.
The declaration of an outright moratorium on rents in time of peace
would be of doubtful validity, however great the public emergency. Yet
restrictive legislation of housing is not novel, although the full extent of
the state's regulatory power is still undetermined. During the housing
shortage following the World War various remedial measures were devised
and instituted.3 Rental legislation provided a defense to an action for the
recovery of more than a "reasonable rent." 4 The possessory action of sum-
mary dispossess proceedings against tenants holding over was suspended,
and the right of eviction denied save* for certain specified exceptions.5
Despite immediate vociferations of "due process," "equal protection," "free-
dom of contract," and "impairment of the obligation of contracts" the rcgu-
latory measures were upheld.6 Interference with the transaction of govern-
ment business and the existence of a social emergency constituting a menace
to health, morality, and general welfare were regarded, as temporarily affect-
ing the landlord-tenant relationship with a public interest7 As stated in
Compensation Insurance (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 164. But see Stone, Some
Views on Compulsory Automobile Insurance (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 151;
Ives, Compulsory Liability Insurance, with Special Reference to Automo-
biles (1925) 59 Am. L. REv. 138.
I See infra notes 3 and 4. For foreign legislation and decisions see:
CAIRNS, RENT RESTRICTIONS (1923); VEILLER, HOW ENGLAND IS MEETING
"THE HOUSING SHORTAGE (1920).
2 138 Misc. 745, 247 N. Y. Supp 53 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
3 The measures employed to remedy the situation may be classified as
follows: (a) Government construction. Massachusetts authorized city
and town acquisition of real property to provide shelter for inhabitants.
Mass. Gen. Acts 1920, c. 554; MAss. CONsT. AMENDMENTS (1920) art. 47.
Federal construction was likewise carried on. Great Britain undertook to
build 500,000 houses under its Housing and Town Planning Act of 1919. 9
& 10 GEO. V, c. 35. (b) State and local advancement of funds. Wis. Laws
1919, c. 402; N. D. Laws 1919, c. 150; S. D. CONSTr. (1920) art. 13 § 17.
(c) Tax exemptions. (d) Rental regulation and restriction on eviction.
See Dodd and Zeiss, Rent Regulation and Housing Problems (1921) 7
A. B. A. J. 5.
4 "District of Columbia Rents," 41 STAT. 298 (1920) ; "Housing Laws of
New York," N. Y. Laws 1920, c. 130-139, 942-953; Wis. Laws 1920, c. 16,
28. Similar legislation was passed in other states.
5Ibid.
6 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921) ; Levy Leasing Co.
v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289 (1922); Marcus Brown Holding Co.
v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1921); People ex rel. Dur-
ham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601 (1921).
7 Block v. Hirsh, supra note 6, at 155, 41 Sup. Ct. at 459.
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Block v. Hirsch, "A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may
justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change." Like the
Emergency Rent Laws the action of the Relief Committee was designed to
have only a temporary effect.0 But unlike the post-war measures the order
in the instant case proposed to permit tenants to remain in possession with-
out the payment of any rent, an action that appro.imates the commandeer-
ing of private property without compensation. An important factor in the
sustainment of the Emergency Housing Laws was the express provision for
a "reasonable rent."
The instant case represents municipal rather than state action. That
fact should not detract from the significance of the issue presented; the
imperative need for legislative action is just as apparent." Other methods
of accomplishing the purpose of the Committee are available. The purely
statutory remedy of summary dispossess proceedings may be abolished."*
The delay effected by the more dilatory action of eviction offers at least a
short respite to the impoverished tenant. The period of required notice to
move may, likewise, be extended.- Suspension of the right to collect rent
would, however, result in a shifting of the burden upon a particular class
of persons, "themselves sorely pressed in this crisis," rather than upon the
community where it rightfully belongs.13 As emphasized by the instant
court, "the problem is one for the public and quasi-public agencies to solve."
THE OVERCAPITALIZATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF
STOCK TO COVER BoN.D DISCOUNT
THE price an investor will pay for bonds is a function of many variables,
among them the rate of interest thereon, the security behind the iszue an'!
the credit of the issuer. If the rate of interest they bear equals the "mar-
ket rate" of interest for investments of a comparable nature and security,
they may be sold at 100 per cent of their face value. But if the rate of
return is less than this hypothetical "market rate," the bonds can be Sold
only at a discount, in which case the issuer fails to realize from their sale
the full face value of the instruments.' Furthermore, if the bonds have
3 Ibid. 157, 41 Sup. Ct. at 460.
9 See ibid. 157, 41 Sup. Ct. at 460. The New York acts were to be ef-
fective until Nov. 1, 1922. See also Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feld-
man, supra note 6, at 170, 41 Sup. Ct. at 466.
10 "The housing of the poorer classes has become a pressing problem in
all populous western countries." ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (1:th ed. 1920)
tit. Housing, Vol. XIII, 814, 826. "The maintenance and distribution at
reasonable rates, during time of war, public exigency, emergency, or dis-
tress, of a sufficient supply of food and other common necessaries of life
and the providing of shelter, are public functions. . . ." BASs. CONST.
AmEN-D. (1920) art. 47. See also (1921) 9 CALIF. L. REV. 337, 338 n. 11.
311 See People ex rel. Durham Real Estate Corp. v. La Fetra, supra
note 6, at 440, 130 N. E. at 605: "The legislature might repeal or suspend
m whole or in part the remedy of summary proceedings for the possession
ot real property." See also Dodd and Zeiss, supra note 3, at 10.
- See Dodd and Zeiss, supra note 3, at 12.
13 See instant case at 747, 247 N. Y. Supp. at 55.
1Conversely, if the offered rate is higher than the "market rate," the
bonds can be sold at a premium. For a more detailed analysis of bond
prices see DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1926) 512.
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been marketed through investment banking houses the issuer loses an addi-
tional fraction of their face value by way of a brokerage fee.2 The recent
case of In re Central Maine Power Company 3 raises the question of whether
these discount and brokerage costs are proper items of capitalization by a
public utility.
With the permission of the Maine Public Utilities Commission the power
company between 1910 and 1927 issued bonds of the face value of $19,066,-
500. From their sale the utility realized $17,74T,475. In 1928 the un-
amortized discount amounted to $791,386.61, for which sum the utility had
issued temporary notes. The company then sought the approval of the
Commission for an issuance of common stock of an amount sufficient to take
up these notes. This application was refused by the Commission on the
ground that bond discount was but deferred interest, which should be paid
for out of earnings rather than capitalized. The Supreme Judicial Court,
agreeing with the Commission as to the nature of this discount, upheld the
latter's order, stating that the statute setting out the purposes for which a
utility might issue stock permitted an issuance for no such purpose as this.4
Accountants agree that bond discount and brokerage are items properly
chargeable to operating expenses and not to capital.5 Through a failure to
apply this principle courts and commissions have all too often permitted
these items to be capitalized. The question of their capitalization arises in
two classes of cases, those involving valuation for rate-making and those in-
volving petitions for approval of security issues. Of the two, the valuation
cases are by far the more numerous. Prior to 1914, it was a common prac-
tice for railroads to charge these items to their construction account.0 To-
day this is prohibited by the Interstate Commerce Commission.7 State com-
The practice of issuing bonds at a discount is often desirable because in
khat way the fixed charges which must be borne in the early years of a
corporation's development are less than if the bonds were issued at the
"market rate." The assumption is that a slightly greater redemption price
works less hardship on the corporation than meeting the "market rate"
of interest in its early days. See MALTBIE, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PUB-
LIC UTILITY VALUATION (1924) 71.
2 For a discussion of the advantages of marketing securities in this man.
ner see DEWING, op. cit. mupra note 1, at 836.
3 153 AtI. 187 (Me. 1931).
4 The statute authorized the utility to issue securities, after obtaining
approval of the Commission, (1) for the acquisition of property to be used
in carrying out its corporate purposes; (2) for the construction, compleA
tion, extension or improvement of its facilities; (3) for the improvement
or maintenance of its service; (4) for reimbursing the treasury for actual
expenditures for these purposes; (5) for discharging or refunding these
liabilities. ME. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 62, § 41.
5 In brief their position is that bond discount, existing only if the bond
pays' less than the "market rate" of interest, is simply a postponed payment
of interest that must be made at maturity of the obligation. Brokerage is
an expense of procuring capital to be payed out of earnings. Both of these
items should be amortized over the life of the securities, and in no event be
charged to the capital account. See DEWING, op. cit. supra note 1, at 513;
HATFIELD, ACCOUNTING (1929) 70, 229-31; 2 KESTER, ACCOUNTING, THEORY
AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1925) 364.
o HATFIELD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 230; CLEVELAND AND POWELL, RAIL-
ROAD FINANCE (1912) 334.
7 CLASSIFICATION OF INCOME, PROFIT AND Loss, AND GENERAL BALANCE
SHEET ACCOUNTS FOR STEAM RoADs (1914) 23, 39-41; UNIFORM SYSTEM! OP
[Vol. 40
NOTES
missions for the most part likewise insist that these items cannot be capi-
talized, but must be paid out of earnings by amortization over the life of the
bonds.8 This policy, recommended in 1922 by the National Association of
Railway and Utility Commissioners, 9 is supported by a majority of the court
decisions it and by most economists." On the question of whether addi-
tional bonds or stock may be issued to cover discount and broherage costs
there is less definite authority.' There is no uniformity in the decisions of
commissions, 3 and, so far as is known, the instant case is the first dzcision
of a court on the point.
ACCOUNTS FOR ELECTRIC RAILWAYS (1914) 59, 61, 69, 76, 81; CLASStFICA-
TION OF INCOME AND PROFIT AND Loss ACCOUNTS FOR CAPRIERS BY lTER
(1918) 15, 21; FORM OF GENERAL BALANCE SHEErT STATEMENTS FOR CAll-
RIERS BY WATER (1913) 19-20; Texas Midland Ry, 75 I. C. C. 1 (1918).
For similar Interstate Commerce Commission regulations see UNIFOnm
SYSTEM OF ACCOUN-TS FOR ExPRESS COMPANIES (1914) 60, 69, 73, 79; UNi-
FORM SYSTEM OF AccOuNTs FOR TELEGRAPH AND CABLE COMPANIES
(1914) 10, 49; UNIFORM SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTS FOR TELEPHONE COMPrNIES
(1913) 14, 23, 53. The provisions for railways are discussed in 2 WHITTEN,
VALUATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) 1007, 1137.
S In re Janesville Water Co., P. U. R. 1915A 178 (Wis. 1915) ; Re Balti-
more County Water & Electric Co., P. U. R. 1918F 522 (Md. 1918); Re
Great Falls Gas Co., P. U. R. 1922D 385 (Mont. 1922) ; Charleston v. Public
Service Commission, P. U. R. 1924B 601 (W. Va. 1923); Commission ex
rel. Roanoke v. Roanoke Water Works Co., P. U. R. 1925B 303 (Va. 1924);
Re Great Falls Gas. Co., P. U. R. 1928E 803 (Mont. 1928) ; Re Logan Gas
Co., P. U. R. 1929A 232 (Ohio 1929); Re Nashville Ry. & Light Co., P. U.
R. 1929A 664 (Tenn. 1929). Additional cases are cited in LwSEnqUIST,
PUBLIC UTILITY FINANCE (1927) 224, n. 26.
9 UNIFORI CLASSIFICATION OF ACCOUNTS FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES (1922),
discussed in 2 WHITTEN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1014, 1039.
'10 Minneapolis v. Rand, 285 Fed. 818 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Reno Power
Co. v. Public Service Commission, 300 Fed. 645 (D. C. Nev. 1921); Gal-
veston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258 U. S. 388, 42 Sup. Ct. 351 (1922).
Contra: Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 271 Pa. 346, 114
Atl. 369 (1921).
11 BAUER, EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1925) 219-22;
MALTBIE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 71; 1 SPURR, GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF PUB-
LIC UTILITY REGULATION (1925) 380; CLEVELAND AND POvELL, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 334; LAGERQUIST, op. cit. supra note 8, at 229; 2 WHITrEN, op.
cit. supra note 7, at 1137; Waltersdorf, State Control of Utility Capitaliza-
tio. (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 337, 349; BARNES, PUBLIC UTILITY CONTROL LN
MAsSACHUSETTS (1930) 69. NASH, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
(1925) 128, takes the view that whereas bond discount should not be cap-
italized, yet brokerage should. For the regulations of the Secretary of
the Treasury of the United States in regard to the treatment of bond
discounts for income tax purposes see I STANDARD FEDERmL TAX SERVICE
(1931) 107.
'12 Many states regulate by statute the purposes for which utilities may
issue securities. These statutes are discussed in Waltersdorf op. cit. oupra
note 11, at 338. No statute provides for or prohibits the issuance of stock
for this specific purpose. Their general tenor is that stock may be issued
only for purposes properly chargeable to capital account.
"3 Permitting issuance: In re Omaha & Lincoln Ry. & Light Co., P. U. R.
1915B 416 (Neb. 1915) ; Re Omaha, L. & B. Ry., P. U. R. 1917A 907 (Neb.
1916); Re United Electric Power Co., P. U. R. 1928B 641 (R. I. 1927).
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While no necessary correlation exists between the capitalization of a util-
ity and the "fair value" on which it is entitled to earn a return,14 yet any
capitalization increases the amount of stock on which investors expect a re-
turn. If the stock is issued against items not properly included in the base
on which a return may be earned, this capitalization, though increasing the
capital on which returns must be paid to investors, does not increase the
gross return allowed the utility. The resultant "overcapitalization" impairs
the security of the utility and lessens the ease with which it can obtain capi-
tal.25 If commissions are so to supervise utilities as to enable them to ren-
der to consumers efficient service, the credit of these concerns must be main-
tained at its highest possible point. The present decision, interpreting the
statute as not authorizing the issuance of stock to cover bond discount, goes
far toward achieving this end.
TAXATION OF INCOME FROM SALE OF ROYALTY OIL AND GAS UNDER "CAPITAL
GAIN" SECTION OF REVENUE ACT
THE decision of a Federal District Court that the income from the sale of
royalty oil and gas is taxable as "capital gain" 1 recently gave rise to con-
siderable excitement among the holders of oil and gas royalties who
anticipated substantial savings in income tax payments. 2 This excitement
will be somewhat cooled by the news of the reversal of that decision by
the Circuit Court of Appeals in Alexander, Collector of Internal Revenuo v.
King 3 where it was held that such income is not taxable as "capital gain"
at a 12'1/2 per cent rate but is subject to surtax assessments as "ordinary
income." 4
Since the federal courts have regarded an oil and gas "lease" 5 as merely
Prohibiting issuance: Re Hampton Waterworks Co., P. U. R. 1918C 171
(N. H. 1918) ; Re Merchants Heat and Light Co., P. U. R. 1919F 664 (Ind.
1919); Re Penobscot Power Co., P. U. R. 1922E 861 (Me. 1922); Re
Missouri Gas & Electric Service Co., P. U. R. 1923C 635 (Mo. 1923); Re
Missouri Gas & Electric Service Co., P. U. R. 1924E 84 (Mo. 1924); Re
Nevada, California & Oregon Telephone & Telegraph Co., P. U. R. 1927B
662 (Cal. 1926). The cases on this question are discussed in Lagerquist,
op. cit. suprq note 8, at 236.
14 Exception should be made here to Massachusetts, where a closer cor-
relation than elsewhere exists between capitalization and the amount on
which a return may be earned. In such a case, the undesirable effect of
"overcapitalization" on rates is clearly apparent. For the Massachusetts
situation see BARNES, op. cit. supra note 11, at 125.
15 The relation of "overcapitalization" to consumers is ably discussed in
BONBRIGHT, RAILROAD CAPITALIZATION (1920) 13-63; BARNES, op. Cit. spra
note 11, at 125.
2 King v. Alexander, Collector of Internal Revenue, C. C. H., Vol. III
1930, § 9094 (W. D. Okla. 1930).
2 See C. C. H., Vol. II 1930 § 4017.
3 C. C. H., Vol. III 1931 § 9021 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931).
4See Revenue Act of 1926, § 208. 44 STAT. 19 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A.
§ 939 (1928). Act of 1928, § 101. 45 STAT. 811 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A.
§ 2101 (1928)..
r Since the landowner has no corporeal interest which he can lease, the
term "lease," though uniformly used, is misleading. See Simonton, The
Nature of the Interest -of the Grantee Under an Oil and Gas Lease (1918)
25 W. VA. L. Q. 295, 325.
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transferring a right of profit & prendre-an incorporeal interest-to the
"lessee," the cash consideration received from such transfer has been held
not to be "capital gain" arising from the sale of a "capital ass2t." 6 The
court in the instant case concludes that since the royalty oil, in which the
landowner has no corporeal interest until its extraction,? is just as much a
part of the consideration for the "lease" as is a cash payment, the income
derived from the sale of such oil is not to be classified as "capital gain." 8
The opposite result reached by the lower court was based upon two decisions
of the Board of Tax Appeals holding that the income from an "outright"
sale of a portion of the reserved royalty interest constitutes "capital gain." '
The instant court sees a distinction between a "lease" and the sale of the
reserved royalty interest in that one is a "lease for a term" and the other
an "outright sale." 1" A distinction based on this reasoning, however, seems
unconvincing in view of the fact that such a "lease" is more properly an
absolute grant of a profit & prendre, defeasible upon a failure to produce oil
or do other acts within a certain time, but lasting until the profit is ex-
hausted if a well comes in.".
Yet for purposes of taxation a difference between the income from a sale
of a portion of the reserved royalty interest and the income from the
"lease," represented by the income from the sale of the royalty oil, may p2r-
haps be justified if viewed in the light of the entire tax program. The
federal courts have uniformly held that the income from a mining "lease,"
either of coal or ore, is ordinary income, the reason being that the
"lease" is not the sale of the minerals in place and is therefore not the sale
of a capital asset.12 Accordingly the taxing of income from the sale of the
royalty oil as "income" rather than "capital gain" avoids discrimination be-
6 Burkett v. Commissioner, 31 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929), certiorari
denied, 280 U. S. 598, 49 Sup. Ct. 14 (1929); Berg v. Commissioner, 33 F.
(2d) 641 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1929), certiorari denied, 280 U. S. 598, 49 Sup.
Ct. 14 (1929).
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190, 20 Sup. Ct. 576 (1900); Sum-
mers, Legal Interests in Oil and Gas (1921) 4 ILL. L. Q. 12, 167.
s See Ferguson v. Commissioner, C. C. H., Vol. III 1930, par. 9002 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1930), supporting the instant decision but contra on the question
of "cash bonus."
9' Murphy v. Commissioner, 9 B. T. A. 610 (1927); Reynolds v. Commis-
sioner, 10 B. T. A. 651 (1928); I. T. 2524, LM-1 Cum. Bull. 199.
10 See svpra note 3, at 8656. The deed in the Murphy case contained
the following words: ". . . do hereby grant, sell and convey unto ...
their successors, heirs and assigns forever, an undivided one half
interest in and to all the oil and gas and other minerals in and upon the
following described lands. ... It being the intention by this instrument to
convey to the grantees herein what is commonly known as a one sixteenth
royalty or one half of the one eighth royalty to come to the lessors in the
leases above described." Supra note 9, at 612.
11 See Krutzfeld v. Stevenson, 86 Mont. 463, 476, 234 Pac. 553, 556 (1930).
Cf. "lease" forms in SUMMIERS, OIL AND GAS (1927) 746-759. The right to
the royalty is at best no more than a right of profit i prezdre and is in
practical effect less. As the majority of traffic in royalties is in fractions
of the one eighth ordinarily reserved by the lessor the interest of the royalty
holder is so small that he is precluded from drilling for himself at the
expiration of the existing "lease."
1United States v. Biwabik Mining Co., 247 U. S. 116, 38 Sup. Ct. 462
(1918) ; Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U. S. 503, 37 Sup. Ct. 201
(1916); Rosenberger v. McCaughn, 25 F. (2d) 699 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928).
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tween similar industries. Furthermore since the Revenue Act in question
expressly provides for deduction for depletion in the case of "mines, oil and
gas wells and other mineral deposits" it would seem clear that there was
no intention that the income from the transfer of mineral rights by "lease"
should be treated as "capital gain" arising from the sale of a "capital
asset." 13 On the other hand sales of reserved royalty interests, because
they constitute a sale of contingent right to income, seem to be sufficiently
analogous to stock and security sales, the profits from which have been
regarded as "capital gain,"'14 to call for the same treatment accorded such
sales. In addition, by assessing the income from the sale of reserved roy-
alty interests as "capital gain," the general purpose of the "capital gain"
section of the Revenue Act is served in that free traffic in such royalties is
not handicapped by the fear of prohibitive surtaxes in the year the profit
is realized.1 5
FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALrIES AS THE SUBJECT OR MEASURE OF
STATE TAxATION
MODERN tendencies of government have lent increasing significance to the
"familiar aphorism that 'as the means and instrumentalities employed by
the general government ... are exempt from taxation by the states, so are
those of the states exempt from taxation by the general government.'" I
The expansion of governmental activities has aggravated the demand for
revenues and also widened the range of possible immunity from taxation.2
To some members of the Supreme Court these tendencies have seemed
to call for renewed vigilance lest traditional exemptions be disregarded
in the desperate search for additional revenues; 3 other members have been
more concerned to avoid hampering taxation unnecessarily by a "mechani-
cal application of the rule . . . regardless of the consequences to govern-
ment." 4 This division of opinion was apparent in the familiar cases of
Long v. Rockwood 5 and Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippia which extended
13 See § 204 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926. 44 STAT. 14 (1926), 26
U. S. C. A. § 935 (1928); Stratton's Independence v. 1lowbert, 231 U. S.
399, 34 Sup. Ct. 136 (1913).
14 Gilbert's Estate v Commissioner, 20 B. T. A. 765 (1930); I. T. 2502
VIII-2 Cum. Bull. 128 (1930); C. C. H., Vol. II (1930) par. 4007. Of
course the stock must not be part of the seller's stock in trade.
15 See Report of Committee on Ways and Means, p. 10, quoted in instant
case; supra note 3, at 8053.
1 See Willcuts v. Bunn, 51 Sup. Ct. 125, 126 (1931).
2 See Cohen and Dayton, Federal Taxation of State Activities and State
Taxation of Federal Activities (1925) 34 YALE: L. J. 807, 825; 4 THE NEW
REPUBLIC 284 (Jan. 28, 1931).
3 See dissenting opinion in Educational Films Corporation of America v.
Ward, 51 Sup. Ct. 170 (1931).
4 See majority opinion in Educational Films Corporation of America v.
Ward, supra, note 3.
5 277 U. S. 142, 48"Sup. Ct. 463 (1928).
6277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451 (1928). A recent decision of the Supreme
Court is of some interest in this connection. A suit was brought in the
Court of Claims by the State of Alabama to collect a tax on the sale by the
United States of power generated at its dam at Muscle Shoals, The dis-
missal of the suit was affirmed "not upon the merits" but "for want of
jurisdiction." Alabama v. United States, U. S. Daily, Feb. 25, 1931, at
3942.
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immunity to royalties from patents and profits from sales of gasoline to
the United States government. It appears again with the erstwhile dis-
senters now in the majority, in Educational Filis Corparation of Amcrica
v. Ward,7 which sustains the right of the State of New York to include in
the taxable net income of a corporation royalties received from the licensing
of copyrights.
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Stone, avoids the question
whether copyrights, like patents are government instrumentalities, by rest-
ing the decision upon the ground that the income of the corporation was
not the subject but the measure of the tax, which was levied upon the
privilege of exercising the corporate franchise. For the distinction be-
tween the subject and the measure of a tax there is ample authoritya culmi-
nating in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.0 which upheld a federal tax leAed upon
the corporate franchise and measured by the entire corporate income,
including interest on tax-exempt municipal bonds. But it has been sug-
gested that this is a distinction without substance, likely to be abandoned
or devitalized by the Supreme Court, lest it serve as a cloak for the taxa-
tion of federal instrumentalities.10 This prediction seemed partially ful-
filled in the case of Macallen Co. v. M11assachusetts 11 which characterized
the Flint case as an "extreme example" and prohibited the inclusion of
income from federal securities in the measure of a state franchise tax.
Thanks to the attempt of the Court in the Macallen case to distinguish it
from the Flint case by reference to the legislature's "specific intent" to
reach tax-exempt securities, Mr. Justice Stone is able to make the same
distinction between the principal case and the Macallen case although the
facts are essentially similar.- Thus, without any overt overruling of
precedent, the doctrine that the measure of a tax may include tax-exempt
property is restored to favor.
But the majority opinion admits, and the dissenting opinion insists, that
it is the duty of the court to determine whether what the legislature has
designated as the measure of-the tax is not in fact its subject. The arbi-
trary character of that determination is well illustrated in both opinions.
The dissenters point to a decision of the New York Court of Appeals in
which, in order to hold unconstitutional a particular provision of the statute
involved in the principal case, it characterized the tax as "in substance,
though not in form, in tendency, though not in name . . .equivalent to a
tax upon relator's income." 13 The majority points with equal persuasive-
ness to a later opinion of the same court which, in order to hold the rest
7Supra note 3. Justices Sutherland, Van Devanter, and Butler dissented.
8 Hamilton Company v. Mass., 6 Wall 635 (1868) ; Society for Saving v.
Coite, 6 Wall. 594 (1868) ; Provident Institute v. Mass., 6 Wall. 611 (1868) ;
Home Ins. Co. v. N. Y., 134 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct. 593 (1890); Plummer v.
Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 20 Sup. Ct. 829 (1900).
9 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911).
10 Isaacs, The Subject Measure of Taxation (1926) 26 COL. L. RE%,. 939.
"1279 U. S. 620, 49 Sup. Ct. 432 (1929).
12 The court in the Macallen case based its finding of intent largely upon
the fact that the legislature had passed an amendment which removed from
the original act the specific exclusion of federal securities. But the statute
involved in the principle case had been twice amended, once to include "all
interest from federal, state, municipal or other bonds" and again to include
"income from any source." Cf. Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U. S. 713, 47 Sup.
Ct. 280 (1927).
13 People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. Y. Knapp, 230 N. Y. 48, 56,
129 N. E. 202, 205 (1920).
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of the statute constitutional, labeled it as "primarily a tax levied for the
privilege of doing business in the state." 14 But whichever of these labels
be accepted, the 'fundamental problem is unaffected, for whether the par-
ticular tax be on franchise or income its interference, if any, with the
functions of copyrights is identical.'s Thus the distinction between sub-
ject and measure appears to be not so much a basis as a form of decision,
perhaps a convenient method of retreat from the extreme to which the
doctrine of the immunity from taxation of federal instrumentalities has
teen lately carried.16 The real justification for the result may be found
in Mr. Justice Stone's supplementary argument-an echo of his own and
Mr. Justice Holmes' dissents in previous cases 1 -that "viewed in the light
of actualities" the tax imposes no "such real or direct burden on govern-
ment as to call for the application of a different rule."
RIGHT OF PREFERRED SHAREHOLDERS TO DIVIDENDS ON DISSOLUTION
IN view of the present business depression and the consequent dissolution
of many business enterprises the recent case of Penington v. Commoanwealth
Hotel Corp.- presents a matter of some importance to corporate sharehold-
ers. The charter of this corporation provided that upon liquidation of the
corporation a preference was to be allowed the preferred shareholders of
the par value of their preferred shares "and all unpaid dividends accrued
thereon." Although no profits were ever earned, a surplus remained after
the creditors of the corporation had been paid and the preferred shareholders
had received the par value of their shares. Reversing the decree of the
Chancellor,2 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the preferred share-
holders were entitled to an additional preference out of this surplus to the
extent of the unpaid accrued dividends.
Since it is rather unusual for a corporation which has earned no profit
over a period of years to have a surplus upon liquidation after paying off
both its creditors and the par value of its outstanding preferred shares, it
is not strange that there are few adjudicated cases dealing with the situa-
tion in the principal case. In England it was first held 3 that a provision
for a preference to the preferred shareholders of "arrears (if any) . . .
of dividends" applied only if the surplus remaining after preferred pay-
ments was a profit, since there could be no "dividends" unless there were
"earnings." The English court subsequently expressly overruled 4 this
holding on the ground that there is a distinction between the division of
surplus assets, with which the court was dealing, and the declaration of a
dividend.5 But in a more recent case, the same court fastened on the word
14 People ex rel. Bass, Ratcliffe & Gretton, Ltd., v. Tax Commission, 232
N. Y. 42, 46, 133 N. E. 122 '(1921); aff'd, 266 U. S. 271, 45 Sup. Ct. 82
(1924).
15 For an excellent discussion of the fundamental problem see Metcalf &
Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172 (1925).
16 Cf. (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 136.
17 See Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, supra note 6, at 222, 48 Sup. Ct.
at 453; Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, supra note 11, at 634, 49 Sup. Ct. at
437; Long v. Rockwood, supra note 5, at 148, 48 Sup. Ct. at 465.
1U. S. Daily, Jan. 30, 1931, at 3648 (Del. 1931).
2 151 Atl. 228 (Del. Ch. 1930).
3 In re W. J. Hall & Co., Ltd., [1909] 1 Ch. 521. See note 6 A. L. R. 822
(1920).
4 In re Springbok Agricultural Estates, Ltd., [1920] 1 Ch. 563; In re
Dominion Tar & Chemical Co., Ltd., [1929] 2 Ch. 387.
5 See In re New Chinese Antimony Co., Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch. 115, 118.
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"due," in the pihrase "arrears of dividends due," to hold that dividends, pay-
able to the preferred shareholders on liquidation, included only those
earned.6
Prior to the principal case, the American courts which dealt with this
specific matter were divided. The New York Appellate Division 7 fcllowcd
the earlier English cases, while the Virginia court s reachcd the opposite
conclusion by adopting the reasoning of the later English decisions. The
effect of the instant holding is to place the preferred shareholders in a posi-
tion not unlike that of debenture holders entitled to the payment of interest
on their investment.9 It would seem that if the parties had intended such
a result they would probably have used a substitute for the -word "divi-
dends" which conventionally, at least, includes payments only out of prZfit.'"
PROTECTION FROM COLLATERAL ArTAcK AcCORDED INVESTOns I.
MUNICIPAL BONDS
INVESTORS in municipal corporation bonds have frequently found their se-
curity reduced to mere pieces of paper when courts have been led to declare
such an issue invalid.' The desirability of safeguarding such investors
manifests itself in a trend, both in legislation and judicial deci-
sion, toward immunizing the validity of such bond issues from collateral
attack. This trend is indicated in the case of Pcnton r. Brown Crz7mcr
Investment Co.2 where municipal bondholders successfully enforced an
assessment lien given as security for the bond issue despite the collateral
attack of a property owner based upon an alleged lack of a quorum at the
meeting of the City Council at which the bonds were authorized.
The rule appears well established that the action of a municipal corpora-
tion in issuing bonds cannot be attacked collaterally for mere irregularities
or formal defects.3 Nor may a collateral attack be made upon the legal
existence of the municipality since its de facto existence and activity will
be sustained until questioned in a direct proceeding of qnto waran-,to.4 But
where the objection is based upon the exercise of power or authority by
the municipality beyond the scope of its charter or the failure to comply
with some condition precedent to valid activity, collateral attack is gzn-
In re Roberts & Cooper, Ltd., [1929] 2 Ch. 383. See Note 11920) :30
CoL. L. REv. 118.
7 Michael v. Cayey-Caguas Tobacco Co., 190 App. Div. 618, 1S0 N. Y.
Supp. 532 (1st Dep't 1920).
8 Drewry, Hughes Co. v. Throckmorton, 120 Va. 859, 92 S. E. 818 (1917);
Johnson v. Johnson & Briggs, 138 Va. 487, 122 S. E. 100 (1924).
9 See Note (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 118.
10 Cf. In re Espuela Land & Cattle Co., [1909] 2 Ch. 187 (preferred
shareholders entitled to "interest" but not "dividends" on dissolution).
I See Robertson v. Rural Special School District No. 9, 155 Ark. 161, 214
S. W. 15 (1922) ; Bristow Battery Co. v. Payne, 123 Okla. 137, 141, 252 Pae.
422, 426 (1926); with which cf. Board of Comm'rs of Rogers C0unty v.
Bristow Battery Co., 28 F. (2d) 195 (D. Okla. 1928).
2 131 So. 14 (Ala. 1930).
3Daly v. Gubbins, 170 Ind. 105, 82 N. E. 659 (1907); 6 MCQTILTN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION S (2d ed. 1928) § 2513.
Albuquerque v. Water Supply Co., 24 N. Bi. 368, 174 Pac. 217 (1918);
Cook v. Town of Putnam, 283 S. W. 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); ef. Payne
v. First National Bank, 291 S. W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) (collateral
attack on de facto existence of municipal corporation not allowed although
where the objection is based upon the exercise of power or authority by
its de jure existence had been terminated by quo warranto proceedings).
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erally permissible,5 even though the time for direct appeal has already
expired. 6 When assessment liens underlie bond issues a difficult choice is
presented between the protection of the land owner's right of property and
protection of innocent purchasers for value of the bonds.7 It would seem
that this choice should be resolved in favor of the bondholder both be-
cause the taxpayer has had an opportunity for direct attack, and because
a careful search of the records of the municipality by the bondholder is
frequently neither feasible nor certain to reveal the lack of authority. The
doctrine of "estoppel by recitals" developed in the United States Supreme
Court and followed by several state courts indicates the trend in this direc-
tion.8 Thus where the proper officers make recitals in the bonds which
import compliance with the municipal charter and with all conditions prece-
dent to a valid exercise of municipal authority, a bona fide purchaser of the
bonds need not inquire further into the charter, the municipal record, or
the actual proceedings, and the recitals are conclusive against any defense
of want of jurisdiction The instant case goes even farther in holding
that, where a clerk keeps a record of municipal meetings as required by
law, this record may not be impeached collaterally.'0
The greatest protection which bond holders have yet received has been
accorded by a few states which allow what amounts to a declaratory judg-
ment of validity.1 This procedure takes the form of an action between the
municipality, its taxpayers and the state to show cause why the bonds
should not be validated.1 2 Once validated the determination is conclusive
and after final judgment or expiration of the time for direct appeal no
further attack, direct or collateral, is permitted."3 The extension of this
device would seem to be the most satisfactory method of assuring the pur-
chaser of municipal bonds protection against any defects in the jurisdic-
tion, authority, or procedure of the municipality.
5 Benwood v. Wheeling Ry., 53 W. Va. 465, 44 S. E. 271 (1903) ; Wooten
v. Texas Bitulithic Co., 212 S. W. 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). See Green v.
City of Rock Hill, 149 S. C. 234, 256, 147 S. E. 346, 358 (1929).
GVreeland v. Tacoma, 48 Wash. 625, 94 Pac. 192 (1908); Wooten v.
Texas Bitulithic Co., supra note 5.
7 See instant case, &tpra note 2, at 17.
8 Presidio County v. Noel Young Bond Co., 212 U. S. 58, 29 Sup. Ct. 237
(1908) ; Clapp v. Otoe County, 104 Fed. 473 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900), ccrtioarm
denied, 180 U. S. 638, 21 Sup. Ct. 920 (1900); Andes v. Ely, 158 U. S. 312,
15 Sup. Ct. 954 (1894). With these cases compare the earlier cases of
Nesbit v. Riverside Independent District, 144 U. S. 610, 12 Sup. Ct. 746
(1891). (contra). In the state courts: City of Laredo v. Frishmuth, 196
S. W. 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Marr v. Southern California Gas Co.,
198 Cal. 278, 245 Pac. 178 (1926); Cuddy v. Sturtevant, 111 Wash. 304,
190 Pac. 909 (1920).
9 See Presidio County v. Noel Young Bond Co., supra note 8, at 65, 29
Sup. Ct. at 239.
10 See instant case, supra note 2, at 20.
' 1 FLA. GEN. LAws (Skillman, 1927) Vol. 2, §§ 5106-5129; GA. ANN. CODE
(Michie, 1926) §§ 445-462; Miss ANN. CODE (Hemingway, 1927) Vol. 2,
§§ 4176-4780. In California the method is provided as to each class of
bonds authorized. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1923) art. 9125, § 15 is
typical.
12 The Florida procedure is outlined in Ingram v. City of Palmetto, 93
Fla. 790, 112 So. 861 (1927).
13FLA. GEN. LAWs (Skillman, 1927) Vol. 2, § 5109; GA. ANN. CODE
(Michie, 1926) § 448; Miss. ANN. CODE (Hemingway, 1927 Vol. 2, § 4178;
Thomas v. City of Blakely, 141 Ga. 488, 81 S. E. 218 (1914); of. Fidelity
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 47 Sup. Ct. 511 (1927).
